{"id":115,"date":"2016-01-25T14:41:51","date_gmt":"2016-01-25T13:41:51","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.icrei.fr\/en\/?page_id=115"},"modified":"2016-01-25T16:14:56","modified_gmt":"2016-01-25T15:14:56","slug":"conference-2002","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/www.icrei.fr\/en\/conferences\/conference-2002\/","title":{"rendered":"2002 Conference"},"content":{"rendered":"

IVth International Conference<\/strong><\/p>\n

Property rights, economics and environment: Costal Zone<\/strong>
\n June 2002<\/strong><\/p>\n

AIX-EN-PROVENCE, France<\/strong><\/p>\n

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<\/div><\/div><\/div>\n
Conference Proceedings<\/strong><\/span>General Topic<\/strong><\/span>Selected Papers<\/strong><\/span>General Report<\/strong><\/span>Patronage Committee<\/strong><\/span>Contributors<\/strong><\/span>Associated Institutions<\/strong><\/span><\/div>
\n

The The proceedings were published in French but some papers are available in English (see Selected Papers tab).<\/p>\n

\"Actes-2002\"<\/a> This book presents and evaluates theories and actual experiments in the field of property rights and economic instruments which, beyond command and control, are likely to help solving the pressing issues of sustainable management of the Coastal Zone.<\/p>\n

It is common place to declare that the coastal zone has long been favored for human settlement whether industry, housing, recreation or transportation. This is true not only around the Mediterranean sea but also as a worldwide phenomenon.<\/p>\n

This narrow stretch of land and water is under considerable pressure and subject to competition between private and government agencies for many uses too often incompatible. This situation has been clear for many decades and the proposed solutions were of \u201ccommand and control\u201d type i.e. planning and zoning. As a matter of fact these regulatory tools appear less and less efficient to deal with complex issues of land and water protection and management.<\/p>\n

In the 70\u2019s it progressively appeared that more efficient tools were required such as land use control by government acquisition. Accordingly were created the Conservatoire du Littoral in France, the California Coastal Conservancy\u2026<\/p>\n

Parallel to public initiatives, nature conservation associations began to look upon the coastal zone: The National Trust in U.K. (through Operation Neptune), The Nature Conservancy and the Trust for Public Land in the U.S. redirected their efforts to coastal sensitive areas. In addition the Land Trust Alliance federated some hundred local private or associative coastal land trusts, not to mention the Dutch Natuurmonumenten, the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds, the French Ligue pour la Protection des Oiseaux and numerous partners of Eurosites\u2026<\/p>\n

In order to manage game, hunting associations banded together in North America to set up Ducks Unlimited or in France Fondation des Habitats pour la Faune Sauvage.<\/p>\n

It is worthwhile to pinpoint the fact that these associations imagined new legal devices using extensively voluntary agreements such as covenants, easements transfer of development rights\u2026instead of full fee acquisition.<\/p>\n

In all cases, whether public, private, or through combined efforts, property rights are being defined and modified to accomplish conservation goals.<\/p>\n

Most specialists think that the conditions of a coastal zone version of Hardin\u2019s \u201cTragedy of the Commons\u201d are present:\u201cruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own interest in a society that believes in the freedom of Commons. Freedom in a Common brings ruin to all\u201d If we consider the coastal zone as a common good we must find new ways to preserve and manage it since implementing strict regulations and open access is simply not feasible for practical, ecological and political reasons.<\/p>\n

We must explore to what extent property rights (public, common and private) and economic tools such as transfer of development rights, compensation and betterment devices, easements, covenants, concessions, negotiable permits, land and inheritance taxes\u2026could combine and meet the objectives of sustainable development by public\/private joint collaboration.<\/p>\n

As a matter of fact a prerequisite to successful achievements is the active participation of millions of stakeholders (farmers, landowners, local governments, shellfish farmers, land trusts, harbor authorities,\u2026). Beyond regulation of private and public land and water arises the tricky issues of management and responsibility for pollution and nuisance.<\/p>\n

Dealing both with concepts and successful experiments the Conference aimed at imagining new institutional arrangements and tools in order to protect and manage the coastal areas for the new century.
\n

Go to top<\/a><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
\n

As for the three past international conferences, we shall present and evaluate theories and actual experiments in the field of property rights and economic instrument likely to help solving the pressing issues of sustainable management of the Coastal Zone.
\nTop world specialists (mainly lawyers and economists), officials, conservation leaders, NGO will participate as well as land owners, land trusts, developpers, hunting and shooting associations ,in addition with farming, oil companies, port authorities, aquaculture, banking interests…<\/p>\n

Facts<\/strong><\/p>\n

It is common place to declare that the coastal zone has long been favored for human settlement whether industry, housing, recreation or transportation . This is true not only around the Mediterranean sea but also as a worldwide phenomenon.
\nThis narrow stretcht of land and water is under considerable pressure and subject to competition between private and government agencies for many uses too often incompatible. This situation has been clear for many decades and the proposed solutions were of “command and control” type i.e. planning and zoning. As a matter of fact these regulatory tools appear less and less efficient to deal with complex issues of land and water protection and management.
\nIn the 70’s it progressively appeared that more efficient tools were required such as land use control by government acquisition. Accordingly were created the Conservatoire du Littoral in France, the California Coastal Conservancy\u2026
\nParallel to public initiatives, nature conservation associations began to look upon the coastal zone: The National Trust in U.K. (through Operation Neptune), The Nature Conservancy and the Trust for Public Land in the U.S. redirected their efforts to coastal sensitive areas. In addition the Land Trust Alliance federated some hundred local private or associative coastal land trusts, not to mention the Dutch Natuurmonumentum, the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds, the French Ligue pour la Protection des Oiseaux\u2026
\nIn order to manage game, hunting associations banded together in North America to set up Ducks Unlimited or in France Fondation des Habitats pour la Faune Sauvage. It is worthwhile to pinpoint the fact that these associations imagined new legal devices using extensively voluntary agreements such as covenants and easements instead of full fee acquisition.
\nIn all cases, whether public, private, or through combined efforts, property rights are being defined and modified to accomplish conservation goals.
\nMost specialists think that the conditions of a coastal zone version of Hardin’s “Tragedy of the Commons” are present:”ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own interest in a society that believes in the freedom of Commons. Freedom in a Common brings ruin to all”. If we consider the coastal zone as a common good we must find new ways to preserve and manage it since implementing strict regulations of free access is simply not feasible for practical and political reasons.<\/p>\n

Go to top<\/a><\/div>\n

Towards new solutions<\/strong><\/p>\n

We must explore to what extent property rights (public,common and private) and economic tools such as transfer of development rights, compensation and betterment devices, easements, covenants, concessions, negotiable permits, land and inheritance taxes\u2026could combine and meet the objectives of sustainable development by public\/private joint collaboration.
\nAs a matter of fact a prerequisite to successful achievements is the active participation of millions of stakeholders (farmers, landowners, local governments, shellfish farmers, land trusts, harbor authorities,\u2026). Beyond regulation of private and public land and water arises the tricky issues of management and responsibility for pollution and nuisance.
\nDealing both with concepts and successful experiments the Conference will aim at evolving new institutional arrangements and tools in order to protect and manage the coastal areas for the new century.
\nUnlike many colloquia and research project which for the last decades have dealt with “integrated coastal zone management” our thought processes will be limited, pragmatic, and prospective as basic stakeholders and decision makers meet in order to find implementation instruments. Tools and means are more important than long agreed objective.<\/p>\n

Go to top<\/a><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
\n

The proceedings were published in French but some papers are available in english:<\/h4>\n<\/p>\n

Overlapping jurisdictions and management systems in the Philippine coastal zone: Palawan experience<\/a>, By Atty. Grizelda \u201cGerthie\u201d Mayo-Anda
\n<\/span><\/p>\n

Choosing Property rights for Coastal Zones<\/a>, By Audun Sandber
\n<\/span><\/p>\n

Economic Valuation, Economic Instruments and Property Rights: Coral Reefs in Southeast Asia\u00a0<\/a>, By Herman Cesar
\n<\/span><\/p>\n

Regulation, private stewardship, and the role of technology in Coastal Zone protection,<\/a>\u00a0By Michael De Alessi
\n<\/span><\/p>\n

Non-Exclusive Resources and Rights of Exclusion : Private Property Rights in Practice<\/a>,
\nBy Hannes H. Gissurarson<\/span><\/p>\n

Property Rights, Economics and Environment: Coastal Zone Strategic Management at the Coast: Stewardship and Partnership Approaches<\/a>, By Diane A Dumashie<\/span><\/p>\n

Protecting Coastal Land through Land Trusts<\/a>, By Jean Hocker<\/p>\n

Neptune Coastline Campaign : A Model for Coastal Protection and Management<\/a>, By John Longworth-Krafft<\/span><\/p>\n

Turtle Conservation: Private Provision of a Public Good<\/a>,
\nBy Roger Bate
\n<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

Chumbe Island Coral Park –\u00a0 A Private Marine Park in Zanzibar (Tanzania)\u00a0\u00a0<\/a>
\nBy Sybille Riedmiller<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Coastal zone land tenure : A small island’s perspective\u00a0<\/a>
\nBy Gillian Cambers, Annette Muehlig-Hofmann, and Dirk Troost<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

\n

By \u00a0Henri Lamotte, General Reporter<\/strong><\/p>\n


\nTowards a Sustainable Development for Coastal Resources in the 21st Century<\/strong><\/p>\n

THE BOTTOM-LINE<\/strong><\/p>\n

The coastline is experiencing a growing physical, human and economic pressure – a fact evidenced by Catherine Bersani, author of the Coastline Act Report. The coastline economic growth potential stirs up a number of use conflicts:<\/p>\n

\u00b7 Conflicts between professional and recreational users;
\n\u00b7 Conflicts between various professional activities (farmers v. shell-fish breeders);
\n\u00b7 Conflicts between riparian owners, tourists and coastline operators (e.g., hotel managers, beach operators,\u2026)
\n\u00b7 Conflicts between environmentalists and territorial users.<\/p>\n

Governmental authorities usually design regulatory solutions to these different conflicts.<\/p>\n

This conference has attempted to prove this approach is deficient. Other complementary and alternative solutions merit our attention; such alternatives are based on closer and more balanced partnerships between governmental authorities and private stakeholders and, more importantly, among private stakeholders themselves. Cooperation may involve the revival of instruments such as the recognition of property rights on the one hand, and the development of contractual relationships between equal partners, on the other hand.<\/p>\n

This conference has provided a number of national and international experiments (e.g., the Chausey Islands – France, the Caribbean Islands, Tanzania, Norway and Iceland,\u2026).<\/p>\n

The diversity of lectures opens four perspectives for thought and debates.<\/p>\n

PERSPECTIVES FOR THOUGHT<\/strong><\/p>\n

\u00b7 Role assigned to seacoast conservation agencies, private operators and conservation easement<\/p>\n

American “Land Trusts”, alike the British National Land Trust, are interesting examples. These bodies are non-profit making organizations and benefit from tax relief measures thanks to which they can allocate huge amounts of money to the preservation of the Nature without despoiling the owners. In most cases, Land Trusts enter into fair and sustainable contracts with owners (e.g., contracts based environmental easements) whereby the latter are bound to manage properly their lands and receive a financial compensation in return.
\nLand Trusts can, if needed, buy these lands but will have to pay the market price for them.
\nNew programs have been initiated in France, and notably the National Foundation for the Preservation of Habitats and the Wildlife. This foundation was established in 1979 by the National Hunter Association; the foundation intends to buy out outstanding natural territories in order to “safeguard” them (land control) and to confer the management upon local federations.
\nOther initiatives should surface alike that which has been announced by the “Salins-du-Midi” company during this conference; The “Salins-du-Midi” company, a French salt-producing company, has just created the “Living Coastline” Association, an association comprising a number of private shoreline areas owners and designed to guarantee a sustainable development for coastal areas where everybody’s interests are taken into account.<\/p>\n

Perpetuating and expanding such private conservation agencies will require a fiscal revision.<\/p>\n

\u00b7 The renewal of public authorities’ approach to coastline management matters: a renewal resulting from contractual relationships designed to promote environmental objectives<\/p>\n

Public authorities regard the development of contractual relationships as a cultural revolution disrupting with the traditional government intervention means (e.g., direct appropriation, regulation, and taxation).<\/p>\n

The French case can be illustrated with the two following examples. On the one hand, public authorities have entered into Territorial Management Contracts with farming operators by 1999. Such contracts are entered voluntarily and permit to reconcile environmental preservation with agricultural activities. They also aim at resolving use conflicts between professionals (e.g., between cattle-breeders and shell-breeders in Etel, Brittany). The Natura 2000 Program is another example whose implementation has stirred up a number of criticisms, among which:
\n\u00b7 Lack of a real dialogue between territories operators (e.g., farmers, foresters, hunters, fishermen\u2026) and public authorities during the perimeters establishment stage;
\n\u00b7 Lack of a scientific assessment program;
\n\u00b7 Vagueness of the targeted objectives and future constraints;
\n\u00b7 Lack of a compensation system for owners.<\/p>\n

How and to which extent can management be based on more balanced dialogue and contractualization procedures? This is one the questions which has surfaced with the Natura 2000 Program.<\/p>\n

\u00b7 Risks of ambiguity regarding public authorities’ responsibilities and roles<\/p>\n

Public authorities are, currently, in charge of the three following missions:
\n\u00b7 Regulation;
\n\u00b7 Assessment;
\n\u00b7 Acquisitions.<\/p>\n

Nevertheless, is it fair and economically-efficient that the Coastline conservation agency, a public department under the Ministry for the Environment and Sustainable Development, assigns to only one operator the following powers:
\n\u00b7 The power to influence the price for commodities;
\n\u00b7 The power to make their prices;
\n\u00b7 The power to compel owners to give up their rights.<\/p>\n

Practically speaking, such a concentration of responsibilities is not efficient since the conservation agency does not manage the acquired territories; furthermore, such a concentration is not fair as well since owners are despoiled from their rights.<\/p>\n

In the future, the government will not be able to bear all of these functions and will have to focus on one of them (the regulatory function, for instance).<\/p>\n

\u00b7 The compensation for public easements, specifically development easements<\/p>\n

Debates have attested the extreme diversity of national and international cases for compensation.<\/p>\n

In the United States, courts rely on the “taking” procedure to provide large compensations (this procedure cannot be properly described with only a few words).<\/p>\n

In France, the Land Development Code has established a principle of non-compensation for land development easements. From an economist point of view, this non-compensation principle satisfies neither fairness nor efficiency criteria and generates two side-effects: on the one hand, over-regulation will occur; on the other hand, the development of alternatives to public easements will be hindered (e.g., contractual easements with private owners providing for a fair compensation).<\/p>\n

Conclusions<\/strong><\/p>\n

The present debates raise a number of questions:
\n\u00b7 Are there any limits?
\n\u00b7 Should we set some limits? Which price should we pay? A solution might consist in revamping a land tax properly designed to extract the land rent.
\n\u00b7 Which roles do private seacoast conservation agencies and easements have in countries where these institutions are insufficiently developed?
\n\u00b7 Will public authorities develop contract-based solutions for managing coastal areas?
\n\u00b7 Insofar as any confusion in public authorities’ roles and functions generates inefficiencies and despoliation, how could we prevent such a confusion between regulatory, assessment and appropriation functions that government bears in coastal areas management matters?
\n\u00b7 To which extent should public easements, and particularly land development easements, open an action for compensation?<\/p>\n

The evolution of the European Court of Human Rights’ case-law is addressing these questions but provides no ready-made solution.<\/p>\n

Go to top<\/a><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
\n

Under the Patronage of <\/strong><\/p>\n

de l’UNESCO,
\nde Michel BARNIER, Membre de la Commission Europ\u00e9enne<\/em>
\net de Walter SHWIMMER, Secr\u00e9taire G\u00e9n\u00e9ral du Conseil de l’Europe<\/em><\/p>\n

Yves COCHET, Ministre de l’Am\u00e9nagement du territoire et de l’Environnement<\/em>
\nJean GLAVANY, Ministre de l’Agriculture et de la P\u00eache<\/em>
\nChristine LAZERGES, Pr\u00e9sidente du COnservatoire du Littoral<\/em><\/p>\n

Members<\/strong><\/p>\n

Jean Hocker, pr\u00e9sidente du Land Trust Alliance
\nCatherine Bersani, Conseil G\u00e9n\u00e9ral des Ponts et Chauss\u00e9es
\nSerge Antoine, Pr\u00e9sident du Comit\u00e9 21
\nJean Fran\u00e7ois Saglio, pr\u00e9sident d’honneur de l’IFEN
\nJean-Fran\u00e7ois Minster, Pr\u00e9sident Directeur G\u00e9n\u00e9ral,de l’IFREMER
\nPierre Delaporte, pr\u00e9sident d’Espaces pour Demain
\nKarl Grotenfelt, pr\u00e9sident de European Landowners Organisation
\nMichel Vauzelle, pr\u00e9sident de la R\u00e9gion Provence Alpes C\u00f4te d’Azur
\nJean Claude Gaudin, maire de Marseille
\nJean No\u00ebl Gu\u00e9rini, pr\u00e9sident du Conseil G\u00e9n\u00e9ral des Bouches du Rh\u00f4ne
\nMaryse Joissains, maire d’Aix en Provence
\nLouis Le Pensec, S\u00e9nateur, Ancien Ministre de l’Agriculture et de la P\u00eache
\nEsperanza Aguirre, ancien ministre, Pr\u00e9sidente de Instituto de Ecologia y Mercado
\nPierre Aguiton, pr\u00e9sident de Rivages de France
\nPaul Ronci\u00e8re, Secr\u00e9taire G\u00e9n\u00e9ral \u00e0 la Mer aupr\u00e8s du Premier Ministre
\nGilbert Simon, directeur g\u00e9n\u00e9ral du Conseil Sup\u00e9rieur de la P\u00eache
\nDidier Quentin, pr\u00e9sident de l’Association Nationale des Elus du Littoral
\nG\u00e9rard Tendron, directeur de l’Office National de la Chasse et de la Faune Sauvage
\nJacques Bourdon, pr\u00e9sident de l’Universit\u00e9 Aix-Marseille III
\nHenri Germain Delauze, pr\u00e9sident de COMEX
\nStephen R. Edwards, directeur du programme socio-\u00e9conomique de l’UICN
\nCharles-Henri de Ponchalon, pr\u00e9sident de la F\u00e9d\u00e9ration Nationale des Chasseurs
\nG\u00e9rard Dumonteil, pr\u00e9sident du directoire des Salins-Europe
\nJean-Fran\u00e7ois Colomer, pr\u00e9sident de la Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 de Agriculeurs de France<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

ANTOINE Philippe, SCI des \u00eeles de Chausey,
\nARNAUDUC Jean-Pierre, Chasseurs de France
\nBALLU ROUSSEAU Genevi\u00e8ve, Minist\u00e8re de l\u2019Environnement,
\nBALOSSIER Jacques, Salins du Midi,
\nBANN Eric and COOPER Andrew, Coastal studies Research Group (Ulster),
\nBASRAOUI, Minist\u00e8re Equipement (Maroc),
\nBATE Roger, Institute of Economic Affairs (Londres),
\nBAZIN Patrick, Minist\u00e8re de l’Agriculture,
\nBECKER Pierre, GEOCEAN,
\nBELTRAME Pierre, Universit\u00e9. Aix Marseille,
\nBENEST Gilles, France Nature Environnement ,
\nBERSANI Catherine, Conseil G\u00e9n\u00e9ral des Ponts et Chauss\u00e9es ,
\nBIGLIONE Franck , Universit\u00e9 d\u2019Aix-Marseille,
\nBLANCHET Dominique, Universit\u00e9 de Guyanne et Antilles,
\nBOISSERY Pierre, Agence de l\u2019Eau RMC,
\nBOUGEANT Pierre, Conservatoire du Littoral,
\nBOUIN Fr\u00e9d\u00e9ric, CRIDEAU (Limoges),
\nCECCALDI Hubert-Jean, Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes,
\nCENTI Jean-Pierre, Universit\u00e9 d\u2019Aix-Marseille ,
\nCESAR Herman, Coral Reef Alliance (NL),
\nCHARLEZ Annie, Office National de la Chasse et de la Faune Sauvage,
\nCLAMAGIRAN Etienne, Architecte,
\nCOOPER Andrew, Coastal Studies Reaserch Group (Irlande du Nord)
\nCREPIEUX Didier, Coordination Nationale Natura,
\nDALBIN Jean-Philippe, Universit\u00e9 Aix-Marseille,
\nDAVID Val\u00e9rie, Universit\u00e9. Aix Marseille,
\nDE ALESSI Michael, Consultant (San Francisco),
\nDEHEZ Geoffrey, Universit\u00e9 de Bordeaux IV,
\nDEJEANT-PONS Maguelonne, Conseil de l\u2019Europe,
\nDELOGU Orlando, University of Maine,
\nDESTANDEAU Fran\u00e7ois, CEMAGREF – Bordeaux,
\nDUMASHIE Diane, ARICS, (GB),
\nDUMONTEIL G\u00e9rard, Salins Europe,
\nESCAILLE Thierry (de l\u2019) European Landowners Organisation (Bruxelles),
\nFALQUE Max, d\u00e9l\u00e9gu\u00e9 g\u00e9n\u00e9ral,
\nGERARD Bernard, Conservatoire du Littoral (Rochefort),
\nGIRARDIN Monique, Association Nouvelle Cal\u00e9donie,
\nGIRAUDEL Catherine, CRIDEAU (Limoges),
\nGISSURARSON Hannes, Universit\u00e9 d\u2019Islande,
\nGLEIZES Jean-Marie, Minist\u00e8re de l’Environnement,
\nGODEL Denis, Association Port Miou pour tous,
\nHENOCQUE Yves, IFREMER,
\nHOCKER Jean, Land Trust Alliance (Washington),
\nHOSTIOU Ren\u00e9, Universit\u00e9 de Nantes,
\nHROUCH Martine, Minist\u00e8re de la p\u00eache (Maroc),
\nJEANSON Paul, Marcanterra,
\nJONCKHEERE (de) Sophie, European Landowners Organisation,
\nLAMOTTE Henri, Minist\u00e8re des Finances ,
\nLEGUE-DUPONT Pascale, Anthropologue ,
\nLESCAULT Jacques, Petites Iles de France,
\nLONGWORTH-KRAFFT John, National Trust of England and Wales,
\nLUNDIN Carl Gustav, IUCN,
\nMARTEAU St\u00e9phane, Architecte,
\nMAYO-ANDA Gerthie, UNESCO Philippines,
\nMUEHLIG-HOFFMAN Annette, UNESCO,
\nPARAVY Jean-Claude, Minist\u00e8re de l\u2019Equipement,
\nPAZ Olivier, Rivages de France,
\nPERRON Daniel, Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 des Agriculteurs de France,
\nPOULAIN France, Institut Fran\u00e7ais d’Urbanisme,
\nREBUFAT Genevi\u00e8ve, Avocat (Marseille),
\nREMOND-GOUILLOUD Martine, Universit\u00e9 de Paris,
\nRENARD Vincent, CNRS,
\nRIEDMILLER Sibylle, UNESCO Tanzanie,
\nSANDBERG Audun, Bodo University (Norv\u00e8ge),
\nSAYER Michael, Friends of Countryside,
\nSCHMIDT Frederik, Universit\u00e9 de Copenhague,
\nSIMON Patrick, Avocat (Paris) ,
\nTRAPITZINE Richard, Consultant, Etudes Fonci\u00e8res,
\nTROOST Dirk UNESCO,
\nTRUCHET Catherine, Petites Iles de France,
\nVICENTE Nardo, Universit\u00e9 Aix-Marseille III,
\nYAGI Hiroki, Otaru University of Commerce (Japon). <\/div>\n

\n

Agences de l’Eau
\nAssociation Nationale des Elus du Littoral
\nAssociation des Etudiants de Provence
\nBanque Modiale
\nCEDEM (Rennes)
\nCentre International de Droit Compar\u00e9 de L’environnement (Limoges)
\nCenter for Private Conservation (Etats-Unis)
\nCOMEX Group (Marseille)
\nCommission Europ\u00e9enne
\nCompetitive Entreprise Institute (Washington)
\nConseil de l’Europe
\nConseil G\u00e9n\u00e9ral des Bouches du Rh\u00f4ne
\nConseil Sup\u00e9rieur de la P\u00eache
\nConservatoire du Littoral
\nCountry Landowners Association (GB)
\nEnglish Nature
\nCRIDEAU Limoges
\nEnvironment Probe (Canada)
\nEspaces pour Demain
\nEtudes Fonci\u00e8res
\nEuropean Landowners Organisation(Bruxelles)
\nEurosites
\nFacult\u00e9 d’Economie Appliqu\u00e9e
\nF\u00e9d\u00e9ration des Associations de Chasseurs
\nF\u00e9d\u00e9ration Nationale des Chasseurs
\nFondation Jos\u00e9 Maria Blanc
\nG\u00e9ocean
\nIFREMER
\nInstitute of Economic Affairs (Londres)
\nInstituto de Ecologia y Mercado(Madrid)
\nInternational Association for the Study of Common Property
\nLand Trust Alliance, (Etats-Unis)
\nMinist\u00e8re de l’Agriculture et de la P\u00eache(DERF)
\nMinist\u00e8re de l’am\u00e9nagement du Territoire et de l’Environnement, (DNP)
\nMinist\u00e8re de l’Equipement
\nMission interminist\u00e9rielle d’am\u00e9nagement du littoral
\nOffice de la Mer de Marseille
\nOffice National de la Chasse et de la Faune Sauvage
\nPetites \u00eeles de Frances
\nPlan Bleu
\nPolitical Economy Research Center
\nR\u00e9gion Provence C\u00f4te d’Azur
\nRivages de France
\nSalins du Midi
\nSecr\u00e9tariat G\u00e9n\u00e9ral \u00e0 la Mer
\nSoci\u00e9t\u00e9 des Agriculteurs de France
\nTotal Fina Elf
\nUICN \/ IUCN
\nUNESCO
\nUniversit\u00e9 d’Aix-Marseille
\nVille d’Aix en Provence
\nVille de Marseille\u2026<\/p>\n<\/div><\/div><\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

IVth International Conference Property rights, economics and environment: Costal Zone June 2002 AIX-EN-PROVENCE, France<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"parent":33,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-115","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.icrei.fr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/115","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.icrei.fr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.icrei.fr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.icrei.fr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.icrei.fr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=115"}],"version-history":[{"count":16,"href":"https:\/\/www.icrei.fr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/115\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":152,"href":"https:\/\/www.icrei.fr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/115\/revisions\/152"}],"up":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.icrei.fr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/33"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.icrei.fr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=115"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}