{"id":153,"date":"2016-01-25T16:09:35","date_gmt":"2016-01-25T15:09:35","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.icrei.fr\/en\/?page_id=153"},"modified":"2016-01-25T18:05:23","modified_gmt":"2016-01-25T17:05:23","slug":"conference-2000","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/www.icrei.fr\/en\/conferences\/conference-2000\/","title":{"rendered":"2000 Conference"},"content":{"rendered":"

IIIrd International Conference<\/strong><\/p>\n

Property rights, economics and environment: Marine Resources<\/strong>
\n June 2000<\/strong><\/p>\n

AIX-EN-PROVENCE, France<\/strong><\/p>\n

\"Slider3\"<\/a><\/div>
\"slider1\"<\/a><\/div><\/div>
<\/div><\/div><\/div>\n
Conference Proceedings<\/strong><\/span>Content<\/strong><\/span>General Report<\/strong><\/span>Patronage Committee<\/strong><\/span>Advisory group and\/or speakers<\/strong><\/span><\/div>
\n

\"Actes-2000\"<\/a> International Review of Comparative Public Policy – Elsevier<\/p>\n

The 3rd international conference on \u201cProperty Rights, Economics and Environment\u201d has been dedicated to \u201cmarine resources\u201d. The Groupe d\u2019Etudes Droits de Propri\u00e9t\u00e9 et Environnement \/ International Center for Research on Environmental Issues (GEDPE\/ICREI) and the Centre d\u2019Analyse Economique (CAE) have organized this meeting which took place at the Law, Economics and Sciences University of Aix-en-Provence, France.<\/p>\n

During 3 hard-working days (June 21-23, 2000), about fifty-plus speakers \u2013 coming from 12 different countries \u2013 expressed their opinions to a 120-persons floor. Speakers were scholars, professionals, government officials, conservation association members, students\u2026
\nThese proceedings illustrate the diversity of opinions with respect to the role assigned to property rights and economic instruments for managing and preserving marine resources; additionally, some light is shed on the combination of these instruments to the necessary evolution of national, Community and international legislations.<\/p>\n

Two books related to the previous two conferences (held in June, 1996 and July, 1998) have been published in French by Dalloz: \u201cDroits de Propri\u00e9t\u00e9 et Environnement\u201d (1997) and \u201cDroits de Propri\u00e9t\u00e9, Economie et Environnement : Les Ressources en Eau\u201d (2000). In March 2002 Dalloz published \u201cDroits de propri\u00e9t\u00e9, \u00e9conomie et environnement: les ressources marines\u201d.
\nThanks to the financial assistance of the EU Commission, (DG Fisheries) an English version of the 3rd conference proceedings is now available in English.<\/p>\n

Max Falque was trained in law and economics and graduated from the Paris Institute d\u2019Etudes Politiques. He began a professional career as an international consultant on environmental policies since the early beginnings of 1970s after the Ford Foundation awarded him a scholarship for research at the University of Pennsylvania.
\nHe published many articles and books on the relation between environment, planning and development (environmental planning and assessment), and on the implementation of environmental policies based on property rights and economic instruments respecting individual freedom.<\/p>\n

Michael De Alessi specializes in marine conservation and wildlife issues and is former director of the Center for Private Conservation. He received a B.A. in Economics and an M.S. in Engineering Economic Systems from Stanford University and an M.A. in Marine Policy from the Rosenstiel School of Marine and Atmospheric Science at the University of Miami. He is the author of Fishing for Solutions (London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1998), and his articles on private conservation and the oceans have appeared in such publications as New Scientist, Journal of Commerce, International Herald Tribune, The Wall Street Journal Europe and The Asian Wall Street Journal. He lives in San Francisco.<\/p>\n

Henri Lamotte is an economist who graduated from the Paris Institut d\u2019Etudes Politiques and Ecole Nationale d\u2019Administration. Since 1989, he is deputy director at the Finance and Economy Ministry\u2019s Forecasts Department. From 1993 to 1995, he also worked as an economist for the OECD\u2019s Economic Affairs Department. He teaches economics at the Paris Institut d\u2019Etudes Politiques and at the Ecole Nationale d\u2019Administration. The major bulk of his research is devoted to macroeconomics , taxation and environmental and agricultural policies. He co-authored with Jean-Philippe Vincent a couple of books on contemporary macroeconomics.
\n

Go to top<\/a><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
ix<\/td>\nPatronage Committee<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
xi<\/td>\nAcknoledgments<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
xiii<\/td>\nAbout the Editors<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
xv<\/td>\nList of contributors<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
xix<\/td>\nStatement of scope<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
xxi<\/td>\nGeneral introduction
\n<\/strong>Max Falque<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
<\/td>\nPart I. Legal and regulatory issues<\/em><\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
3<\/td>\nIntroduction
\n<\/strong>Max Falque<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
7<\/td>\nProperty rights and seabirds
\n<\/strong>Annie Charlez<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
13<\/td>\nFertilisation of the open ocean : effects of private property rights, economiocs ans the environment
\n<\/strong>Michael Marketls Jr.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
17<\/td>\nFisheries, property rights and regulation of fisheries in ancient Rome : Nihil Noui Sub Mari
\n<\/strong>Yves Peuri\u00e8re<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
25<\/td>\nExisting law : a help or hindrance ? a case study of marine ranching<\/strong>
\nHelen Pickering<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
43<\/td>\neuropean and french sea fisheries legislation in search of individual transferablequotas
\n<\/strong>Jean-Luc Prat<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
53<\/td>\nProperty rights and fisheries in OECD countries<\/strong>
\nCarl-Christian Schmidt<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
69<\/td>\nProperty rights and marine pollution
\n<\/strong>Patrick Simon<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
77<\/td>\nThe evolution of U.K. fisheries management : an overview<\/strong>
\nGregory Valatin<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
<\/td>\nPart II<\/em>. Economics<\/i><\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
119<\/td>\nIntroduction
\n<\/strong>Henri Lamotte<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
123<\/td>\nProperty rights and marine resources : theoretical foundations and applications
\n<\/strong>Jean-Pierre Centi<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
137<\/td>\nEquity and management onstruments in fisheries
\n<\/strong>Joseph Catanzano, Stephen Cunningham<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
147<\/td>\nOvercoming trhe “new tragedy of the commons” : a commercial framework is inevitable<\/strong>
\nRoger Edwrds, Martin Smallridge<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
159<\/td>\nModeling individual transferable quotas for renewable resources
\n<\/strong>Louis-Pascal Mah\u00e9, Carol Ropars<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
171<\/td>\nManaging renewable resouirces : theoretical and empiritical issues for the case of fishing resources
\n<\/strong>Val\u00e9rie David, Sophie Mairesse<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
183<\/td>\nEconomic, institutional and social conditions for efficient property rights
\n<\/strong>H\u00e9l\u00e8ne Rey-Valette<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
197<\/td>\nBeyond regulatory solutions : controlling overfishing with access cotrols<\/strong>
\nJean-Paul Troadec<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
219<\/td>\nDo private property rights lead to the sustainable development and management of marine rources ? an analysis
\n<\/strong>Christoph Vanderstricht<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
<\/td>\nP<\/strong><\/em>art III. Institutions\u00a0<\/em><\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
233<\/td>\nIntroduction
\n<\/strong>Max Falque<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
237<\/td>\nImplementation and future of marine property rights<\/strong>
\nRoger Beattie<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
247<\/td>\nSaving Canada’s fisheries : why we should move from government regulation to systems of self-managed ownership
\n<\/strong>Elizabeth Brubaker<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
255<\/td>\nFisheriy policy of Russia in 1998-1999
\n<\/strong>Victor Chevtchenko<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
265<\/td>\nRemapping the waters : the significance of sea tenure-based protected areas
\n<\/strong>John Cordell<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
293<\/td>\nPrivate property rights, markets and regulation in the 21st century
\n<\/strong>Michael De Alessi<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
307<\/td>\nWhen ideas conspire with circumstances : introducing individual transferable quotas in iceland’s fisheries
\n<\/strong>Hannes Gissurarson<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
341<\/td>\nCo-management and crisis in fisheries science and management
\n<\/strong>Bonnie McCay<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
361<\/td>\nPrivatization of marine resources in European union countries : an overview of national situations<\/strong>
\nChristoph Nordmann<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
369<\/td>\nArtificial reef immersions in the Languedoc-Roussillon coastal zone<\/strong>
\nB\u00e9atrice Pary<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
381<\/td>\nGeneral report and final remarks<\/strong>
\nHenri Lamotte<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
389<\/td>\nSubject index<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n
\n

By \u00a0Henri Lamotte, General Reporter<\/strong><\/p>\n

Henri Lamotte<\/p>\n

The 3rd international conference on \u201cproperty rights, economics and environment\u201d addresses the same problem as the first two conferences, namely the contribution of property rights to environmental protection. Marine resources \u2013 the theme selected for this year \u2013 has proven to be a fruitful illustration for this overall issue.<\/p>\n

A general report always simplifies the debates and imperfectly reflects the diversity of the themes that were discussed, the variety of approaches that were used and the debates\u2019 liveliness. Nevertheless and in my opinion, this conference has provided two lessons: on one hand, property rights can contribute to a sustainable development in many ways; on the other hand, property rights can only be efficient if some conditions are met.<\/p>\n

The different and multifaceted contributions of property rights to marine resources\u2019 sustainable development<\/p>\n

Environmental economists will certainly not be surprised by the diversity of the possible contributions of property rights to marine resources sustainable development. The lack of clearly defined property rights oftentimes results in marine resources misuses; either an open access regime or an imperfect liability system may apply for marine resources.
\nAvailable datas prove that marine ecosystems are subject to a growing and excessive pressure whose forms are multiple:
\n– Deterioration of marine stocks \u2013 as the FAO proved it \u2013 especially in some areas (northern Atlantic, Canada\u2019s salmon, cod and crab fisheries);
\n– Pollution of marine environment in some hot spots (Brittany for instance),
\n– Extinction or threats of extinction of some species and , more generally, damage to bio-diversity.
\nThe conference has perfectly illustrated the diversity and the multifaceted nature of property rights\u2019 contribution to sustainable management arrangements for marine resources; here follows a non-exhaustive list:
\n– Development of civil liability for marine oil pollution and intensive rearing discharges;
\n– Fisheries management either with traditional collective access rights or with the much-debated Individual Transferable Quotas, ITQs;
\n– Marine resources exploitation: fish-farming, algae and pearl farming, construction of artificial reefs and oil platforms;
\n– Finally, protection of endangered species, water birds and marine mammals which requires the abolition of the \u201cres nullius\u201d status \u2013 nobody\u2019s property status; the creation of national parks or marine sanctuaries may be viewed as related to this problem.<\/p>\n

The conference has emphasized how property rights and their wide scope of application could contribute to sustainably manage marine resources; property rights are flexible instruments \u2013 an advantage to adapt to a great number of political-economic backgrounds and respond to a great number of problems. Unfortunately, the term of property right poorly accounts for this flexibility. For economists, property rights mean: individual as well as collective rights, rights on properties that could be traded or not, rights that could be formally or informally designed, territorial access rights, or the right to sue if public, collective or individual rights are infringed.
\nThese rights have different extent, features, duration\u2026 Nevertheless, economically speaking, property rights should have the three following elements:
\n– They should be exclusive: individuals and communities holding these rights \u2013 or being conferred upon by the society \u2013 should be able to exclude whoever refuses to pay or to abide by customary rules;
\n– They should be transferable: property rights\u2019 reallocation should result in efficient management;
\n– They should be durable to foster long-term based management arrangements.
\nRights\u2019 excludability, transferability and durability might induce rights\u2019 holders to adopt optimal management methods in order to preserve resources and to maximize both the value and income to be derived from.<\/p>\n

ITQs illustrate the real and not only the potential benefits that fisheries could grasp with this kind of rights.
\nThe purpose of ITQs was to remedy the poor efficiency associated with fisheries management methods based on access restriction (licenses), input control (ship power, fishing season\u2026) accompanied with an overall quota (TACs and overall quota as applied by the European Union). The problems triggered by such an inefficient management method are well known: over-investment in non restricted production factors, race for fish and shortened fishing period (the Olympic-race-styled fishing, with the Saint-Brieux\u2019s Bay, France, Scallop fishery as a case in point), deterioration of fish quality (caught fishes were to be frozen since fishing periods were sharply shortened), over-equipment by downstream businesses, general decline in the economic profitability of the whole sector. On the other hand, ITQs produce: i) a much more efficient fishing rights allocation; ii) the end of races for fishes; iii) the enhancement of fish quality since fishes no longer need to be frozen \u2013 because the fishing period is extended. Such a positive impact is not purely theoretical: the implementation of ITQs in the British Columbia\u2019s halibut fishery \u2013 in the early 1990s \u2013 has proven to be a fruitful device for this fishery. To a larger extent, OECD\u2019s works OECD (1998)[1] have reviewed the positive consequences of ITQs on a few fisheries: improved stock preservation, alleviated race for fish and reduction in vessels over-equipment even though the benefits of such measures are not immediate.
\nThe contribution of property rights to marine resources\u2019 sustainable management is neither general and absolute but conditional and contingent
\nEfficiency conditions have a technical, economic and social nature. Hereafter, I will focus on fisheries management only.<\/p>\n

Technically speaking, the contribution of property rights, and especially ITQs, to fisheries sustainable management cannot be isolated from the targeted fishery. ITQs seemed to be the appropriate system for mono-species fisheries and species under the jurisdiction of one state. Concerning multi-species fisheries, ITQs appeared as an improper solution due to the importance of by-catches \u2013 this was particularly true for Mediterranean fisheries, except tuna fisheries. Concerning fisheries under the jurisdiction of several states, implementing ITQs was not virtually impossible but raised a number of coordination problems, and especially monitoring problems.
\nEconomically speaking, property rights will positively impact on marine resources provided the following conditions are met:
\ni) The overall quota must be set at an adequate level if resources are to be sustainably managed \u2013 this requires appropriate information about stocks and migration dynamics;
\nii) Operation, control and sanction costs should be proportionate to potential gains; consequently, managing and sustaining this legal device requires a sufficient social, economic and institutional development level;
\niii) Additionally, ITQs measures should not conflict with other instruments; no positive effect on resource management and vessels\u2019 over-equipment should be expected if public authorities still heavily subsidize fisheries;
\niv) Finally, the market for ITQs should not lead to an excess in economic concentration at the benefit of few firms with a significant market power; nevertheless, this is not a fishery-specific issue and, as a result, could be properly tackled by competition policies.
\nThe third kind of condition, social acceptability, is much more crucial: property rights in general, and ITQs in particular, will never be implemented without a public assent.
\nConcerning ITQs, societies will only accept if ITQs advocates can respond to three kinds of concerns expressed by stakeholders, especially fishermen.
\nConcern #1: will an ITQ system increase fishermen\u2019s long-term income?
\nFollowing the cases detailed during the conference, it will. ITQs enhance fish quality, reduce costs, smooth price fluctuations, can be used as collateral for banking loans and provide individuals deciding to quit the market with a net worth \u2013 derived from the ITQ transfer.<\/p>\n

Concern #2: May ITQs trigger an excess in geographic and economic concentration at the expenses of some areas and groups of fishermen?<\/p>\n

Even though this is a real problem, a cautious analysis is required due to some economic ambiguity. At the individual level, the ITQ seller must be better off: he will sell his quota only if the sale will benefit him. Hence, the implementation of a market for quotas will result in utility-maximization. Consequently, quota sales by individuals and\/or regions should raise no fears. At the social level, a social planner might have a concern for quota distribution if his social welfare function is not the mere aggregation\/addition of individual utilities; the social planner might derive utility from the geographic distribution of activities and\/or the number of operating fishermen. In this perspective, the social planner will express a concern for the allocative impact of a market for property rights on marine resources, and notably those of an ITQ system on fisheries. Promoting fishing rights reallocation is the very principle of ITQs; and such reallocations may be economically desirable[2]. However, real-life politics will certainly be inconsistent with heavy inter-regional transfers and will probably recommend to prevent ITQs concentration \u2013 otherwise ITQs will not be accepted.<\/p>\n

Concern #3: Is the ITQ system a fair one?<\/p>\n

The case of Iceland shows that a social consensus on ITQs fairness was a pre-requisite to their long-term acceptability. The concern for fairness is, at first, related to that of the initial allocation of ITQs and, subsequently, to the division of the scarcity rent \u2013 i.e., the difference between the price for fish and the marginal operation cost (the difference must be positive, otherwise resources could not be sustainably managed). Two polar initial assignment procedures may be conceived: i) rights assigned for free on the basis of past catches \u2013 this is the so-called \u201cgrandfathering\u201d system; and ii) a generalized auction. The experience of ITQs in developed countries has proven that the search for an agreement with fishermen is only consistent with a free allocation procedure based on past catches. With this allocation device, the scarcity rent is divided amongst fishermen who exploit the targeted resource at the time of the initial assignment. Given the high price for quotas \u2013 a sign of the scarcity rent, will such a system be considered as fair in the short and in the long run? There is, obviously, no unique and systematic answer to this question. Concerns for equity are contingent to social-political backgrounds. The best I can do is to underline that ITQs flexibility provides a number of options to modify the redistributive consequences of ITQs. The following arrangements are possible solutions:
\ni) A minimum percentage of the overall quota periodically auctioned off;
\nii) A stock of quotas distributed for free to the newcomers;
\niii) A tax system designed either to extract a part of the scarcity rent or to obtain from fishermen a financial contribution for operation, monitoring and sanction costs.
\n I will conclude with three reflections on which virtually every participant to this conference agreed.<\/p>\n

1\/ Property rights, and especially ITQs for managing fisheries, are not universally optimal solutions due to the extreme diversity of situations, traditions and cultures, and due to the complexity of problems raised by a sustainable management for marine resources. Conditions required for an efficient and socially accepted use are hardly met; and these conditions are even more hardly met than ITQs are the only instrument in force. As a matter of fact, ITQs implementation is rooted in a medium\/long term perspective: their implementation requires a long social and political maturation. In this respect, Iceland is a case in point since ITQs implementation was extended over 10 years with an experimental period exceeding 8 years (1983-1990).<\/p>\n

2\/ Conversely, property rights\u2019 flexibility is the basic reason why they are an efficient instrument to cope with a number of problems related to marine resources management; this is particularly true since the lack or the incompleteness of property rights frequently occasions these problems.<\/p>\n

3\/ Finally, the fisheries management case reveals the necessity to get the largest variety of instruments to meet the various issues and situations. Property rights are one possible solution to sustainably manage environmental \u2013 and notably marine \u2013 resources. In some situations, property rights may be improper or unacceptable solutions, but experience suggest they may be, together with accompanying measures, an efficient instrument for managing marine resources.<\/p>\n

I will conclude with a few more personal remarks. Concerning property rights contribution to the sustainable management of marine resources, my position is profoundly optimistic in the long run even though in the short run significant political-institutional barriers remain, especially in the European Union. In the long run, however, each social organization will reveal its efficiency. Hence, the most efficient social organizations will spontaneously emerge and eventually prevail in the long run; indeed, social groups adopting them should grow faster than those having adopted the less efficient ones; furthermore, people may pressure their government to adopt the most effective organization methods. In this perspective, property rights defined as a device for a sustainable management of marine resources have a fruitful future.<\/p>\n[1] OECD (1998), \u00ab Les contingents individuels transf\u00e9rables en tant que mesure d\u2019incitation \u00e0 la pr\u00e9servation et \u00e0 l\u2019utilisation durable de la diversit\u00e9 biologique des mers \u00bb, Direction de l\u2019environnement.<\/p>\n[2] In Iceland, 90% of ITQs changed of owner. On the other hand, economic concentration is still limited. Family companies were transformed into joint-stock companies thus leading to the diffusion of capital ownership.
\n

Go to top<\/a><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
\n

Under the Patronage of <\/strong><\/p>\n

Under the presidency of honour of<\/p>\n

Madame Dominique Voynet,
\nMinistre de l’Am\u00e9nagement du Territoire et de l’Environnement.<\/p>\n

Monsieur Jean Glavany
\nMinistre de l’Agriculture et de la P\u00eache<\/p>\n

Joana Schelton, Ancienne Secr\u00e9taire G\u00e9n\u00e9ral adjoint \u00e0 l’OECD
\nEsperanza Aguirre, Pr\u00e9sidente de Instituto de Ecologia y Mercado, Spanish Free Market Environment Research Institute
\nRosalba Giugni, Pr\u00e9sidente de Marevivo (Rome)
\nMario Soares, Pr\u00e9sident de la Commission Mondiale Ind\u00e9pendante sur les Oc\u00e9ans, World Independant Commission on the Oceans
\nAmiral Lanxade, Ambassadeur de France
\nFranck Vorhies, \u00e9conomiste en chef \u00e0 l’IUCN
\nSerge Antoine, Pr\u00e9sident d’Honneur du Comit\u00e9 21 pour la France
\nJean Fran\u00e7ois Saglio, Pr\u00e9sident d’Honneur de l’IFEN, French Environmental Information Service
\nPierre Delaporte, Pr\u00e9sident d’Espaces pour Demain, Pr\u00e9sident d’Honneur d’Electricit\u00e9 de France
\nBaron Nordenfalk, Pr\u00e9sident de European Landowners Organization
\nAmbroise Guellec, ancien Secr\u00e9taire d’Etat \u00e0 la Mer, former Minister
\nLouis Le Pensec, S\u00e9nateur et ancien Ministre de l’Agriculture et de la P\u00eache, former Minister
\nChristian Louit, Pr\u00e9sident d’honneur de l’Universit\u00e9 Aix Marseille III
\nGilbert Peiffer, Pr\u00e9sident de l’Universit\u00e9 Aix-Marseille III
\nHenri-Germain Delauze, Pr\u00e9sident de la COMEX, deep sea research company
\nHannes Gissurarson, Universit\u00e9 d’Islande, Iceland
\nPeter Pearse, ancien Pr\u00e9sident de la Commission Royale sur la P\u00eache (Canada)
\nBernard Tramier, Directeur Environnement Elf, oil corporation
\nHarold Demsetz, Professeur de Science Economique, UCLA
\nIsma\u00efl. Serageldin, Vice Pr\u00e9sident \u00e0 la Banque Mondiale, World Bank
\nJean Fran\u00e7ois Minster, Pr\u00e9sident-Directeur G\u00e9n\u00e9ral de IFREMER, French Institute for Marine Research
\nRoger Beattie, Pr\u00e9sident de Sea-Rights,Inc., Nouvelle Z\u00e9lande
\nFran\u00e7ois Vallat, Pr\u00e9sident de l’Institut Fran\u00e7ais de la Mer, French Marine Institute
\nClaude Mercier, Gouverneurs Rotary International 1999-2001 District 1760
\nAzzedine Kettani, Attorney at Law, Morocco Supreme Court
\nBrice Lalonde , ancien ministre de l’Environnement, Conseiller R\u00e9gional de Bretagne, former Minister of Environment
\nLucien Laubier, Directeur du Centre d’Oc\u00e9anologie de Marseille
\nMichel Vauzelle, President de la Region Provence Alpes C\u00f4tes d’Azur.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

Alban Fr\u00e9d\u00e9rique, CEDEM
\nBrest Anderson Terry, Political Economy Research Center (Montana)
\nAugier Henri, professeur de biologie marine (Marseille)
\nAvon Michel, High-Tech Environnement (Marseille)
\nBachet Fr\u00e9d\u00e9ric, Parc Marin de la C\u00f4te Bleue
\nBailly Denis, CEDEM (Brest)
\nBal Jean-Louis, ADEME (Paris)
\nBate Roger, Institute of Economic Affairs (Londres)
\nBeattie Roger, Sea Rights Investment (Nouvelle Z\u00e9lande)
\nBecker Pierre, G\u00e9oc\u00e9an-Solmarine (Aubagne)
\nBell Nial, CORDAH Consultants (Aberdeen)
\nBernal Patricio, UNESCO
\nBlomquist William, Indiana University
\nBolopion Jacques, Affaires Maritimes (Marseille)
\nBonzon Alain F.A.O. (Rome)
\nBoudouresque Charles Fran\u00e7ois, CNRS (Marseille)
\nBrubaker Elizabeth, Environment Probe Canada
\nCatanzano Joseph, IDDRA (Montpellier)
\nCenti Jean-Pierre, Universit\u00e9 Aix-Marseille
\nChamoux Jean-Pierre, consultant (Paris)
\nCharlez Annie, Office National de la Chasse (Paris)
\nChassy (de) Christian, Expert International (Paris)
\nChevchenko Victor, Commission Interminist\u00e9rielle d’Ichtyologie (Moscou)
\nCordell John, Ethnographic Institute (Berkeley)
\nCuningham Stephen, IDDRA (Montpellier)
\nDavigo Jacques Ing\u00e9nieur G\u00e9n\u00e9ral du GREF
\nDe Alessi Michael, Center for Private Conservation (San Francisco)
\nD\u00e9jardin Daniel, Affaires Maritimes (Marseille)
\nDelauze Henri-Germain, COMEX (Marseille)
\nEdwards Roger, South Australian Lobster Industry
\nEscaille (de l’) Thierry, European Landowners Organization (Bruxelles)
\nFalque Max, d\u00e9l\u00e9gu\u00e9 g\u00e9n\u00e9ral
\nGauthiez Fran\u00e7ois, Minist\u00e8re de l’Agriculture et de la P\u00eache
\nGissurarson Hannes, Professeur de Science Politique (Islande)
\nHuglo Christian, Avocat (Paris)
\nJarmache Elie, IFREMER (Paris)
\nJones Tom, OCDE (Paris)
\nLamotte Henri, Minist\u00e8re des Finances
\nLaroche de Roussane Jean-Pierre, Marine Nationale
\nLepage Henri, Euro 92 (Paris)
\nLeyland Guy, WAFIC (Australie)
\nMah\u00e9 Louis Pascal, ENSA Rennes
\nMarkels Michael Jr, Ocean Farming Inc. (Etats Unis)
\nMassenet Michel, Conseiller d’Etat
\nMcCay Bonnie, International Association for the Study of Common Property
\nMegret Alain, Minist\u00e8re de l’Environnement
\nMorris Julian, Institute of Economic Affairs (Londres)
\nMouton Patrick, journaliste et \u00e9crivain
\nNordenfalk Johan, European Landowners Organisation (Stockholm)
\nNordmann Christoph, Commission Europ\u00e9enne
\nPampillon Olmedo, Instituto de Ecologia y Mercado (Madrid)
\nPary B\u00e9atrice,CETRALMAR (Montpellier)
\nPickering Helen CEMARE (Portsmouth),
\nPiquemal Alain, Universit\u00e9 de Nice
\nPrat Jean Luc, CEDEM, Brest
\nRey H\u00e9l\u00e8ne, Universit\u00e9 de Montpellier
\nSaglio Jean-Fran\u00e7ois, Ing\u00e9nieur G\u00e9n\u00e9ral des Mines
\nSchmidt Carl Christian, OECD
\nShotton Ross, FAO
\nSimon Gilbert Conseil Sup\u00e9rieur de la P\u00eache (Paris)
\nSimon Patrick, Avocat (Paris)
\nSmith Robert J., Competitive Enterprise Institute(Washington)
\nStrosser Pierre, Commission Europ\u00e9enne
\nTramier Bernard, TotalFinaElf, (Paris)
\nTroadec Jean-Paul, consultant international
\nValatin Gregory, ENSA Rennes
\nVanderstricht Christoph, Coopers & Lybrand, Bruxelles
\nVicente Nardo, Universit\u00e9 Aix Marseille
\nWaugh John, IUCN, Washington
\nYandle Bruce, Clemson University (USA)
\nYesou Pierre, Office National de la Chasse. <\/div><\/div><\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

IIIrd International Conference Property rights, economics and environment: Marine Resources June 2000 AIX-EN-PROVENCE, France<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"parent":33,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-153","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.icrei.fr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/153","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.icrei.fr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.icrei.fr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.icrei.fr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.icrei.fr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=153"}],"version-history":[{"count":6,"href":"https:\/\/www.icrei.fr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/153\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":161,"href":"https:\/\/www.icrei.fr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/153\/revisions\/161"}],"up":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.icrei.fr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/33"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.icrei.fr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=153"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}