2006 Conference

VIth International Conference

Property rights, economics and environment: Land Resources
June 2006

AIX-EN-PROVENCE, France

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Conference ProceedingsGeneral TopicSelected PapersGeneral ReportPatronage CommitteeContributorsAssociated Institutions

The The proceedings were published in French but some papers are available in English (see Selected Papers tab).

Actes-2010

As with the past five conferences which dealt with theory and ethics (1996), water (1998), marine resources (2000) , the coastal zone (2002), and wastes (2004) respectively, we have presented and evaluated theories and case studies through the lens of property rights and economic institutions, which offer an alternative to command and control regulation to help solve the difficult issue of land resources.

Land use issues

Lewis Mumford put the issue in perspective in « The City in History », where he explained that land use control and zoning are linked with urban growth and civilization. But this social analysis only addressed a very small proportion of the space inside and outside of highly densely populated cities not exceeding 100 000 inhabitants.
The industrial revolution changed the scale of land use control, and zoning was common practice by the turn of the 19th Century.
But since the early 1960’s environmental considerations have pushed land use controls outside the city limits to include the preservation of open space for decades… if not perpetuity.
This raises three issues:
– how can we reconcile competing land uses ?
– how do we cope with just compensation and the takings issue for long term regulations?
– how should land be managed and who should control land zoned for environmental conservation?
The bureaucratic and political response is simple: ignore landowners property rights and make plans according to ‘the public good’. Use expropriation if necessary to buy land at the lowest price, sometimes after a zoning ordinance has lowered the market value of the land.
If regulation looks rather efficient for urban growth control, it appears too often not only unfair and unconstitutional but ill fitted for long term environmental management of environmentally sensitive areas

Land ownership in perspective

Since the 18th century, ownership and control of land has been a keystone for democracy and capitalism; is this still true in the 21st century? What is the role of ownership and control of land for individuals and societies?
Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, western nations have sought to establish property, property markets and property institutions in eastern Europe and the former countries of the Soviet
Union. The expectation was that these actions would “jump start” democracy and market societies.

Has this happened? If not (and evidence suggests it has not) why not?
Some have suggested that in the post-modern, late-industrial society, private property in land is less important to individuals and society. Yet public policy action and court decisions in the U.S and in Europe seem to continue to reinforce a strong place for public action against the property interests of the individual; why is this so?
The U.S. most prominently, as well as Canada and the UK, have had an organized private property rights advocacy movement for a decade plus. At one level this movement has had impressive success, and yet at another level its impact on policy practice has been minimal. In Europe the role of private property is becoming a central issue focussed by the European Court for Human Rights. How does one explain this paradox and what it says/means about social attitudes about property and policy action towards property?
After half a century, one can assess the dubious outcomes of this type of planning: poor long term environmental protection, high housing costs, corruption, limitation of individual liberty, and questionable constitutional practices.
Land use is key to environmental protection, and so it is time to assess alternatives and consider new tools. If collective resources such as air and water quality can be dealt with to a certain extent by “command and control” this is not true for biodiversity, landscapes, historic places….
Several tools and concepts have been experimented such as TDR, regulatory compensation, easements, covenants, land trusting (whether public or private), private zoning agreements, common property….It will be most interesting to compare Western institutions for environmental land use control with practices in Asia and Africa in order to imagine new workable solutions in terms of democracy and efficiency.
To date? The results do not appear conclusive. Certainly for some resources, property rights and economic tools should be considered and deliberately discussed as a complement and/or alternative to land use regulation. This is of paramount importance if we want to protect individual liberty and achieve environmental protection.
One cannot expect governments to imagine and set up other solutions since they derive most of their political and financial clout and power from zoning and permitting procedures not to speak of creeping local governments corruption opportunities.

The The proceedings were published in French but some papers are available in English:

The complexities of property-regime choice for environmental protection
Daniel H. Cole

The U.S. Sup. Ct’s Holding in Kelo v. City of New London is a Threat to Property Rights and Market Driven Land Use Decision Making in any Jurisdiction inclined to follow its flawed rationale
Orlando E. Delogu

Property rights in two states of nature

Richard Epstein

Property Rights in Two States of Nature: A Discussion of Evolving Rights 
Bruce Yandle

Economic Evolution on the Northern Plains of the United States: Indian Commons, Privatization, Deprivatization, and Hutterites 

By John Baden and Jennifer Mygatt

The role of farmland owners in providing environmental services: CAP perspectives 
Allan Buckwell

The Potential Role of Market-based instruments in land use planning: lessons from UK regulatory experience  
John Corkindale

Landscape and land property right 
François Facchini

A Market for Transferable Tax Credit for Land Conservation Donations 
Philip M. Hocker

The reference level determining subsidies for good farming practices
Luis Portugal

From multiple stakeholders to dominium plenum and back again: from Rights of Common to World Heritage Sites
Erling Berge

The Future of the Regulatory Taking Issue in the U.S. and Europe: Divergence or Convergence? 
Harvey M. Jacobs

Protecting neighborhood environments privately
Robert H. Nelson

Compensable régulations redivivus
Ann Louise Strong

The destruction of property rights and resulting wildlife catastrophe in Zimbabwe 
Roger Bate

A right to harm: How right-to-farm laws violate rural residents’ property rights and promote unsustainable farming practices

Elizabeth Brubaker

Land Use, Food Production  and Conservation: Property Rights and Institutions   
Michael De Alessi

Land use and global warming  
Carlo Stagnaro

Land Trusts, Easements, and the Role of Private Land Conservation
Jean Hocker

Village Governance Framework and Natural Resources Management in Rural China 
Shi Xiaoping, Qu Futian & Gu Xiang

By  Henri Lamotte

This sixth “Property rights, economics and environment” conference addressing land resource management has resumed issues addressed during the former five conferences – i.e. preserving environment with economic instruments and with markets for rights rather than with environmental taxes.

The topic of this year perfectly illustrates this problematic insofar as land control is a crucial element to preserve the environment since access to environmental resources (e.g. water, areas, fauna and flora…) frequently depends on the access to land.

Three goals were assigned to this conference:

i) Assessing the efficiency, benefits and costs of regulatory instruments which are undoubtedly the most preferred instruments of public authorities for environmental land control issues;

ii) Determining how economic instruments, taxes, fees and tradable permits (solutions increasingly used in other environmental areas) might be used for environmental control purposes; we may think of tradable development rights, compensation for environmental easements, land taxes;

iii) Conceiving new institutions which might both be environmentally efficient and property rights friendly.

A general report is always an over-abridging exercise; summing up in a few phrases the variety of topics, multiplicity of approaches and richness of debates is never an easy task. For sake of simplicity, two major lines have surfaced during the debates; the first one focuses on the classic modalities of public action (I); the second one deals with the potential solutions which might renew, complete and improve public action for land resources issues (II). Nevertheless, we must keep in mind that environmental protection, and not urban planning, is the general theme of this conference.

I. Benefits and deficiencies of classic instruments used by governments for land control purposes

This conference began with an introductory lecture by Olivier Barriere and Etienne Le Roy about the great variety of property rights regimes all over the world. The western system based on private, exclusive and transferable property rights is not the most prevalent regime on all continents. Only 4% of African lands are subject to private property rights. Nevertheless, this variety of institutional regimes leaves unanswered the question of property rights efficiency and of their contribution to capital accumulation and economic development. Hernando De Soto’s book, “The mystery of capital”, has revived this debate.[1]

A. Regulation and direct public appropriation: two classic instruments of land policies used by public authorities

1. Regulation and land planning are two classic instruments used by governments in all countries: setting standards (control-and-command regulations) and determining land uses thanks to zoning. Zoning leads to implement spatialized regulations that will consequently fit local conditions.

2. Direct public appropriation

Were regulation or land planning failing at reaching their objectives, other instruments such as direct appropriation of land resources might be used. Expropriation is a classic procedure in that respect.

This conference is about environment. Therefore, the two above-mentioned public instruments should be examined with an environmental protection objective in mind since they might also be used for other objectives.

B. Deficiencies of classic public instruments

Debates have revealed several deficiencies which reduce the efficiency of these instruments.

1. Lack of environmental efficiency probably due to the lack of direct per-se effect: zoning does not prevent harms caused to environment. The implementation of agricultural protection areas only aims at guaranteeing the distribution of land that benefit agriculture but not environmentally friendly agricultural techniques.

2. Persistent changes in relative values of land resources produced by regulation or land planning.

Land planning brings out significant distributional effects since it produces long-lasting changes of land property rights value. Depending on whether or not land can be developed, its relative value ranges between 1 and 100, or even 1 to 1,000 in areas with a strong land pressure.

3. Losses of economic efficiency deriving from land retention/Malthusianism

Land retention or Malthusianism produces economic and socio-economic efficiency losses as economists put it since the most efficient uses of land cannot be implemented. The cost of urban planning might be directly evaluated with the loss of value resulting from down-classifying a land as an unconstructible one. Such a classification automatically produces socio-economic benefits such as environmental preservation of certain areas and a slowdown of urban sprawling. Lack of evaluation of these benefits makes it impossible to compare costs and expected benefits.

4. Confusing public authorities’ powers and liabilities

This was a much-debated topic during the 2002 conference, a topic perfectly illustrated by the expropriation of the Hyeres Salt marshes belonging to the “Salins du midi” corporation and to the Conservatoire du Littoral. However, the scope of this question goes far beyond this case.

Concerning land issues, public authorities assume three functions:

A regulating and planning function: definition of environmental and urbanism standards and of zoning;

A land purchase function: such purchases are not subject to civil law procedures but to pre-emption and expropriation ones;

An assessment function: when the “Service des domaines”, a French public body dedicated to public properties management and purchases, conducts the assessment of expropriated properties.

Each of these functions has undoubtedly some legitimacy; However conferring all of these functions upon only one actor – i.e. governments or local public authorities – is questionable. Is it fair and economically efficient to grant one body the triple power to influence prices via urban planning or regulation, to make prices ant to appropriate properties by compelling private owners to sell out their properties? Raising the question this way automatically leads to one answer! This Concentration of powers and confusion of responsibilities inescapably brings out corruption risks.

5. Corruption risks

Environmental regulation, latto sensus, and especially land planning are the sources of corruption hazards since they result in land value destructions or creations through administrative decisions. The value differential between approved for development and non-approved for development lands creates a corruption incentive. Decentralisation probably exacerbates the impact of local clientelism and trade-offs insofar as local authorities are in charge of urbanism documents and individual decisions –the French Government is only in charge of general rules. Local urban planning documents (POS and PLU[2]) are subject to a permanent reviewing procedure creating opportunities for tradeoffs. Many lecturers expressed the feeling that corruption was not an occasional phenomenon.

Is corruption a necessary evil to make the system work out? Is corruption just a part of “transaction costs”? The general opinion of conference participants is that corruption is a counterproductive mechanism (lack of transparency, contradiction with a clear right system which is the basis of an efficient free-market economy) and conflicts with the principles on which our democratic societies are based on (the equality before the Law principle)

Hence, what are the available strategies, possible solutions and instruments that might either substitute or complement classic public actions in order to promote a more environmentally friendly management of natural spaces?

II. Renewal of public authorities’ action in the land policy

Three types of approaches have been debated during the conference: land trusts, public/private contracting and use of economic instruments latto sensus.

A. Land trusts and natural spaces management

This topic had still been debated in 2002; land trusts play a crucial role for the preservation of natural spaces notably in Anglo-Saxon countries but also in Latin American countries. Jean Hocker has reminded us the advantages of these land trusts.

Land trusts are non-profit organisations having significant tax rebates which allow to dedicate large financial amounts to the preservation of natural spaces without plundering private owners. Land trusts are usually signing fair and long-term contracts (i.e. environmental easements) with private owners thanks to which the latter are committed to manage their lands pursuant with the land trusts’ objectives in return of a compensation. The price for an environmental easement is set by the reduction of value resulting from the contract. If necessary (e.g. environmental preservation requiring no land exploitation at all), land trusts may purchase these properties but have to pay the market price for them. For the problematic addressed in this conference, land trusts are interesting for three reasons:

this case reminds us that ownership is not a prerequisite condition to space protection; land trusts usually operate with environmental easements signed by private owners and land trusts and through which owners abandon some of their rights (e.g. rights to develop some areas);

this case shows us that natural space protection can be achieved without evicting private owners and by contrast based on fair, mutually beneficial and flexible contracts that can fit any local situation;

this case emphasizes that natural space management must be viewed from a long-term standpoint; therefore, perpetual easements binding land trusts and both current and future owners are useful tools. In this framework, private owners still owns, use, operate and hold the right to sell and transmit their lands but the perpetual easement signed with the Land trust will be binding for all future owners.

Other illustrations of private stakeholders’ involvement and commitment to natural spaces management have been given during this conference. In Europe, Ian Hodge has urged to the development of new private institutions in order to meet the new expectations of societies in agricultural affairs; e.g. a multifunctional agricultural not limited to its classic function of foodstuff production but producing other services as well which might be either market services (e.g. green tourism) or non-market services (e.g. landscape and biodiversity maintenance). Following Ian Hodge, new institutions are required to aggregate the social demand from associations and foundations and the supply from operators’ associations in order to provide homogeneous agro-environmental service while reducing transaction costs between supply and demand of amenities.

In France, the new rural environmental lease contract (Agriculture guideline Act, January 5, 2006) is another illustration of private owners’ commitment to environment protection. This new lease contract balances liabilities of tenants and owners vis-à-vis environmental management. If lands are located in certain areas with specific environments (Natura 2000 areas for instance) owners are allowed to included environmental paragraphs in return of lowered rents.

B. Private/public contracts

The use of private/public contracts in the Land policy has been the topic of a very stimulating debate. Should private/public contracting be favored? Maybe a distinction should be made between urban planning and environmental policies. A number of interesting examples have been mentioned during this conference.

Contracts with farmers designed to preserve water gathering grounds, as Jacques Pelissard mentioned. These contracts provide for compensation with subsidies granted to organic farming practices in order to preserve water quality from agriculture-induced nitrate pollution. Taxpayers do obvioully pay for such a reduction of agricultural nitrate pollution. This is a breach in the polluter-payer principle.

Environmental easements established by Land trusts (see below).

The European Natura 2000 framework.

The “Conservatoire du littoral” policy.

In France, the Conservatoire du littoral is in charge of purchasing and enhancing parcels of coastline. Purchasing is not enough and coastline must be enhanced too. This means public partnerships with local authorities, state-owned companies and certified associations (wild bird protection league, France’s coastlines association…) and private partnerships with private owners associations (the real estate company of Chausey islands for instance) even though the law does not provide for such private arrangements with private owners or their associations. Such partnerships might be designed as arrangements with private owners of private easements (non-aedificandi easements for instance prohibiting all development). Such partnerships are legitimate insofar as the Conservatoire intends to promote environmentally-friendly economic practices – this is why use-based contracts with farmers, vineyard owners and salt producers have been developed.

However, the current legislation does not allow the Conservatoire to delegate the administration of natural spaces to private owners. This differs from the current situation prevailing in other countries where, for instance, Land trusts exist. As a result, the coastline legislation should be amended.

C. Economic instruments, the third possible alternative addressed during this conference

The herewith referred economic instruments are all instruments the goals of which are to substitute or to complement the regulation-based approach with market-based mechanisms thanks to which behaviours might be influenced by market prices either directly (through taxes, fees, subsidies and compensations) or indirectly (with private property rights and markets for rights). This is also a possible solution for addressing the corruption issue. How to introduce some economic instruments into the land policy?

1. Transferable development rights?

At first, we might think of tradable permits just like those which have been successful in other environmental areas (water, air pollution, and fight against climate change). This means transferable development rights in the United States and transferable land-use coefficients in France, a mechanism provided for by the 1976 Act on Natural spaces. However, a consensus among conference participants has not emerged on this topic. Land economics researchers argue that this is a complex framework, hardly reconciling environment and business and, finally, that all over the world transferable-rights solutions had been rarely implemented.

2. Public authorities providing compensation for land amenities and environmental constraints

Since its 2003 reform the Common agricultural policy promotes the adoption of environmental-objectives based compensations for farmers – something that economists call land amenities that is related to landscape quality and farming practices. This is a very direct instrument that is much more efficient than land planning for preserving the environment. This compensation might increase with the amount of produced amenities or imposed constraints. However this possibility raises a problem of amenities evaluation and a problem of public willingness to pay for such amenities.

3. Compensation for environmental easements and land taxation

Just like during the conference about coastal areas four years ago there were lively debates about compensation for environmental easements and taxation – what Anne-Louise Strong coined as “compensable regulation”. The classic conception, notably the French one, argues in favour of non-compensation for environmental easements, which do result in the abolition of property right even though the right of use, one of its attributes, is affected or de facto limited thereof. Pursuant to article 17 of the Human rights declaration, the French civil code only provides for compensation for expropriation. A similar situation prevails in the United States where the 5th amendment provides for two conditions to be met before the expropriation procedure begins: existence of a public interest motive and compensation. In addition to compensation for a public works motive granted which is in France by Public law justice in case of a specific and serious damage and provided that the victim of that work expresses his or her concerns. However, the current legislation differs amongst countries:

In France, article L 160-5 of the urbanism code provides for non-compensation for urbanism easements;

In the United sates, a 1922 Act provided for compensation when regulation is too stringent, consequently resulting in regulatory taking; The U.S. case-law about takings has tremendously grown during the last 20 years.

However, such a conflict of approaches has been softened since the French case-law stated by Public law justice reminded some of the following elements in a 2003 ruling:

i) compensation is always possible except when expressly forbidden and;

ii) compensable damage have to be abnormal and specific.

The debate has been clearly delineated from the 2002 conference:

i) for economists, lack of compensation creates unfairness and economic efficiency losses; indeed, the lack of compensation does not promote a balanced approach of regulation costs and benefits by public authorities since no compensation for such costs is provided for;

ii) However, compensation is not always possible and if it was how would it be evaluated?

iii) Compensation is a very meaningful word with no real equivalent in French; indeed, compensation is not necessarily a pecuniary one; Jurgen Hartmann has presented us a new compensation scheme based on an environmental account – agents affected by regulation are granted environmental points the he or she can use for his/her own purposes or sell to somebody else.

iv) Finally, this compensation should be subject to some conditions. One of these conditions might be the existence of a modern land tax thanks to which land rent might be consistently taxed away. This might look strange for non-French citizens, but no modern land rent exists in France. Such a tax should not be based on a rental value established in 1970 but should be based on the market value of land commodities, the only economically relevant basis. This does obviously requires that the sum of land taxes, capital and capital gains taxes does leas to a confiscating taxation.

4. Eliminating all powers and responsibilities confusions and introducing market-based assessments

Concentrating powers to regulate, expropriate and assess is neither efficient nor fair; Many conference participants consider that governments have to choose amongst these three powers and focus on the most legitimate one for its action – i.e. focusing on the power to regulate and leave other powers to other agents. Assessing worth of taken goods might be viewed as delegated to independent bodies and competing private stakeholders. As G. Dumonteil puts it, taken properties should be at least assessed independently from environmental easements imposed by public authorities.

5. Solutions to alleviate the corruption issues have still to be discovered

In that respect, there is no miracle solution. However, several interesting solutions have been mentioned during the conference.

Extending cost/benefits analyses to any new regulation and public decision;

Ex post control of motives on which public utility status are granted;

Embarking on the way to bureaucratic simplification since legal complexity produces corruption incentives.

Avoiding Malthusian regulations insofar as the land rent growth they produce also create permanent corruption incentives;

Bringing some fields of action out of the public sphere to eliminate the origins of corruption from a structural standpoint, as J-P. Chamoux told it. This is what bureaucratic simplification (i.e. deregulation) means. This also means an increased use of market-based mechanisms to allocate rights.

[1] Hernando de Soto, “The mystery of capital. Why capitalism triumphs in West and fails everywhere else.” Batam Press, 2000

[2] The Plan d’Occupation des Sols, or Plan Local d’Urbanisme, is a Land Use Plan issued by French local authorities.

  • Ministres français (Environnement, Equipement, Agriculture)
  • Directeur Général UNESCO
  • Président Université Paul Cézanne Aix-Marseille
  • Président de l’Association des Maires de France
  • Secrétaire Général Conseil de l’Europe
  • Président de Friends of the Countryside
  • Président du Lincoln Institute of Land Policy
  • Personnalités : José Maria Aznar, Baron Nordenfalk, Pierre Mayet, Maryse Joissains Masini, Gérard Dumonteil, Loyola de Palacio, Jérôme Bignon, Alain Gaudet, Alain Bidault, Jean-Noël Guérini, Jean-Pierre Poly, Pierre Mirabaud, Louis de Rohan Chabot …

– Alterman Rachelle, Technion University, (Israël)
– Ayodele Thompson, Institute of Public Policy Analysis (Nigeria)
– Baden John FREE (USA)
– Balossier Jacques, Salins Participations
– Barbier Jean-Marie, Fédération Nationale Forestière
– Barrière Olivier, Institut de Recherche pour le Développement (Montpellier)
– Bate Roger, American Enterprise Institute
– Beltrame Pierre, Université Paul Cézanne Aix-Marseille
– Benard Vincent, Hayek Institute
– Berge Erling, International Association for the Study of Common Property (Norvège)
– Biglione Frank, Université Paul Cézanne Aix-Marseille)
– Billet Philippe, Université de Dijon
– Blanchet Dominique, Université des Antilles et de Guyane
– Bland François, Ministère de l’Ecologie et du Développement Durable
– Boitel Christian, Avocat aux Barreaux de Nice et de Paris
– Bouckhaert Baudoin, Université de Gand
– Boughera Douadia, INRA-Rennes
– Bouin Frédéric, Université de Perpignan
– Bourassa Steven, University of Louisville
– Bouyssou, avocat au Barreau de Toulouse
– Brubaker Elizabeth, Canada Probe
– Bueb Jean-Pierre, Service Central de Prévention de la Corruption
– Carbonell Armando, Lincoln Institute for Land Policy
– Centi Jean-Pierre, Université Paul Cézanne Aix-Marseille
– Chaigneau Aurore, Université Paris-Nanterre
– Charlez Annie, Office National de la Chasse et de la Faune Sauvage
– Cole Daniel, Indiana University School of Law
– Corkindale John, Environment Agency UK
– Crecente Maseda Raphael, Universidad de Santiago de Compostela
– De Alessi, Reason Foundation (Californie)
– Delacour Thibault, Société des Agriculteurs de France
– Delogu Orlando, University of Maine School of Law
– DeMoor Martina, Université de Gand
– Demouveaux Jean-Pierre, Tribunal Administratif de Versailles
– Ding Chengri, Lincoln Institute et Université du Maryland
– Dumonteil Gérard, Groupe Salins (Bruxelles)
– Epstein Richard, University of Chicago
– Escaille Thierry (de l’) European Landowners Organisation (Bruxelles)
– Facchini François, Université de Rennes
– Falque Mireille, Adonis Architecture Paysage
– Favre Yves, Agence des Espaces Verts d’Ile de France
– Galey Matthieu, Université de Paris
– Galnovskaya Elena, Institut de Législation et de Jurisprudence Comparées (Moscou)
– Gaudet Alain, Ordre des Géomètres Experts
– Gissurarson Hannes, Université d’Islande
– Givaudan Antoine, Directeur au Ministère de l’Equipement
– Gnangui Adon, Institut National Polytechnique de Côte d’Ivoire
– Grolleau Gilles, INRA-Dijon
– Grossan Christian, Conseil Général des Hautes-Alpes
– Hagel Zoé, Agence de l’Eau
– Haumont Francis, Université Catholique de Louvain (Belgique)
– Hocker Jean, Lincoln Institute for Land Policy
– Hocker Philip,Virginia Conservation Credit Pool
– Hodge Ian, University of Cambrige
– Hostiou René Faculté de Droit de Nantes
– Ishwaran Natarajan, UNESCO
– Jacobs Harvey, University of Wisconsin
– Jaeger Lisa, Bracewell and Giuliani (Washington)
– Jouventin Pierre, CNRS Montpellier
– Julienne Christian, Héritage et Progrès
– Langholz Jeffrey, Monterey Institute of International Studies (Californie)
– Le Roy Etienne, Faculté de Droit Panthéon-Sorbonne
– Lecat Gabriel, Université de Bourgogne
– Legg Wilfrid, OCDE
– Lopez Emmanuel, Conservatoire du Littoral
– Macera Frank, Université de Valladolid (Espagne)
– Mayet Pierre, ancien vice-président du Conseil Général des Ponts et Chaussées
– Migué Jean-Luc, Fraser Institute (Canada)
– Morris Julian, International Policy Network (Londres)
– Moyne-Bressand, Alain député-maire (Isère)
– Nelson Robert, University of Maryland
– Nordenfalk Johan, Friends of the Countryside
– Pâques Michel, Université de Liège
– Pattyn Christian, Ligue Urbaine et Rurale
– Peignot Bernard, Avocat au Conseil d’Etat
– Pélissard Jacques, Association des Maires de France
– Pérignon Sylvain, ancien directeur de recherche au CRIDON de Paris
– Perrinet André, Syndicat des Expropriés
– Petit Olivier, Université d’Artois
– Pilate Jean-Michel, Réseau de Transport d’Electricité
– Pitron François, Rivages de France
– Piveteau Vincent, DATAR-DIACT
– Qu Futian, Nanjing Agricultural University (Chine)
– Rébillard Astrid, Université de La Rochelle
– Renard Vincent, CNRS-Ecole Polytechnique
– Sainteny Guillaume, Ministère de l’Ecologie
– Schiavetti Hervé, Maire d’Arles
– Stagnaro Carlo, Instituto Bruno Leoni (Italie)
– Sterling Burnett, National Center for Policy Analysis
– Strong Ann Louise, University of Pennsylvania
– Truchet Catherine, Petites Iles de France
– Truilhe Eve, CNRS-CERIC Aix en Provence
– Villand Marc, Interconstruction
– Wauters Charles, Notariat belge
– Buckwell Allan, Country Land and Business Association (Londres)
– Xiaoping Shi, Nanjing Agricultural University (Chine)
– Yandle Bruce, Clemson University ….

– Agences de l’Eau
– Agence Foncière et Technique de la Région Parisienne
– Agence des Espaces Verts de la Région Ile de France
– Association des Maires de France
– Association Internationale des Maires Francophones
– Compagnie des Experts près la Cour Administrative d’Appel de Marseille
– Communauté du Pays d’Aix
– Conseil de l’Europe (Strasbourg)
– Conseil Général des Bouches du Rhône
– Conseil International de la Chasse (Paris)
– Conservatoire du Littoral et des Rivages Lacustres
– Country Land and Business Association
– DATAR-DIACT
– Etablissement Public Foncier Provence Côte d’Azur
– Etudes Foncières (ADEF)
– European Landowners Organisation (Bruxelles)
– Fédération Nationale des Chasseurs
– Fondation de la Chasse et la Nature
– Fondation pour les Habitats de la Faune Sauvage
– Foundation for Research on Economics and Environment, FREE (USA)
– Friends of the Countryside (Bruxelles)
– FAES (Madrid)
– Fondation de la Maison de la Chasse et de la Nature
– Hayek Institute (Bruxelles)
– Héritage et Progrès (Paris)
– Institut Economique de Montréal (Canada)
– International Association for the Study of Common Property (Etats-Unis)
– Laboratoire d’Anthropologie Juridique (Paris)
– Ligue Urbaine et Rurale/ Espaces pour Demain
– Lincoln Institute of Land Policy (Cambridge USA)
– Ministère de l’Agriculture
– Ministère de l’Ecologie
– Ministère de l’Equipement
– National Center for Policy Analysis
– OCDE/OECD (Paris)
– Office National de la Chasse et de la Faune Sauvage (Paris)
– Ordre des Géomètres Expets
– Petites Iles de France
– Probe Canada
– Reason Foundation (Los Angeles)
– Réseau de Transport d’Electricité
– Rivages de France
– Salins Europe
– Service Central de Prévention de la Corruption
– Société des Agriculteurs de France (Paris)
– Transparency International France
– UNESCO (Paris)
– Xarxa de Custodia, (Catalogne) …